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HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL 
REDUCTION REVISITED: 
AN ATTEMPT OF A RENEWED ACCOUNT 
SEBASTIAN LUFf 
This essay ulternp" a renewed. critical expo')ilion of Husserl's 
theory of the phenomenological reduction. incorporating 
nlllnU'o.crip' material that h:h been publi~hed r.;ince the defining 
essays of the first gencrullon of Husser! research. The discussion 
focuses on poinl~ lhal remain especially crucial. i. c. the concept 
of the nalUral attitude. the ways into the reduction. and 
the qucMion of the "meaning of the reduction". The reading 
attempted here le:lds to two, nOI nece~,arily related, f()(.'al points: 
a Cartesian and a Lifc·world tendency. In fo llowing thtsc two 
paths. Husser! was con,btcnl in pursuing two evident lead!<l in his 
philosophical enterprise: however, he wns at lhe same Lime unable 
to systematically unify these two strand ..... Thu!t. I am offering an 
inlcrpretation which might be called a modified "departure from 
Carte!tianism" reading that Landgrebe propo~cd in hb famou!<-
essay from the nineteell·firtie ... (3 reading thnl is still valid in many 
contempomry c.:Xposilion ... of Husserl's thought) . This discussion 
should make :tpparcnt thai Husserl' s theory of the phenome-
nological reduction dcscrvt!"i a renewed look in lighl of malcriul 
Ihal ha ... since appeared in the Husser/ianG and by incorporaling 
the mOM importanl re .... ull~ of recent tendencies in HUII!'>erl research 
INTRODUCTION 
An author a llempti ng an accou nt o f Husserl' s method o f the 
pheno me nologica l red uction finds h imself in an ungrati fied 
posit ion. This theme is one of the main topics in what is now more 
Ihan six ty years of Husserl research I. Furthermore. this theme has 
I. Whereas the first generation of Husser! research (E. Fink. R. Boehm. 
L. Landgrebe. I. Kern) dealt extensive ly with Ihe problem of the reduction, Ialcly. 
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been so dominant in Husser!'s self-interpretation that talking about 
it equals discussing Husser!'s late phenomenology as a whole. 
However. a general account of what Hu"erl "really intended" with 
his phenomenology risks being sllperficial by concluding with a 
generality every traditional philo~opher would claim as her or his 
final telos: to express the truth about the world. Yel. were it true 
that "all great philosophers think the self-same", we would. on the 
one hand, end up in trivialities regarding philosophical endeavors 
as such; on the other hand. we would miss precisely the point 
which was so important to Husserl , that is precisely the IIniqueness 
of his philosophical method, which di"inguished him from his 
predecessors rather than what he had in common with them. This 
notwithstanding that it was one of his late realizations that he could 
not simply do away with the tradition of which. hc realiLed. he 
himself was a parI. 
Whilc Husscrl' s se lf-charucteriLations especially in his last 
work. "rhe Crisis of Enropean Sciences", seems to put off 
many readers due to their ceremonious formulations, instead of 
approaching Hw.serl from the outside, an approach " from the 
bOllom up" will be more fruitful than a presentation from the 
perspective of his late posi tion , when he already was "certain of the 
future"2 While this may well have bcen the case for Husserl, he 
neve rtheless in sisted that the reduction as the method to enter 
phenomenology is not a device that , once performed. is valid for 
all times. It does nOI entail that the one who has been "converted"] 
would remain so for the rest or his or her lire. Rather. the reduction 
must be practiced repeatedly; the gremest threat for Ihc philosopher 
being to "fallout" of the mindset of the philosophical attitude. This 
threa t is, however. integral to the performance of the reduction. 
If the reduction is the only way into phenomenology as transeen-
c ... pccially in the French phcnonlt:l1ologic:al ... cellc. the reduction ha ... again been 
u dominnnt theme. cfr. the work~ by M. Ilc.:nry nnd l -L. Marion. 
2. err. " Ocr Zu!"unft bin ieh 'Icher", In a leiter 10 hi ... friend G. Albrecht. Ill : 
Brh111't'c/m!l9. PI'. 75 f. (from Decemher 29. 1(30). 
3. The metaphor 01 a rdigiou, comcr ... ion I' the image Hu "erl u~e, 1Il the 
Crisis. err. Kr;s;,\. p. 140: after Cr;Y;" p. l.t I. 
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dental philosophy then it mu st be part of this theory to furnish an 
en trance in a "didactic" fashio n. 
Every philosophical theory is an answer to a problem on the 
basis of which the theory receives its mean ing. and this also goes 
for the reduction. The first piece of theory to lead to the reduction 
is the concept of epoche. This method was intended in the Skeptic 
tradition to gain an unbiased view away from the mi sguided 
theories of the past. Thus. the figure of bracketing is more than just 
terminologically derived fro m th e Skeptics and comes out of a 
well-established philosophical problem. To thi s. Husserl I/olells 
I'olens contributes. Thus. a lthough his framing of the reduction is 
only understandable on the basis of hi s mature transce ndental 
philosophy, th e problem emerges from a ce rtai n philosophical 
context he did nOl create. 
Thus. first we have to explicate the philosophical co ntex t to 
a ce rt a in extent, if only to show that Husserl dist<1nces himself 
from it. Hu sserl aHempt' to suspe nd traditional misconceptions 
in an effon to so lve the fundamental philosophical problem 
of establi shing "true and last ing knowledge". Nevertheless. he ack-
nowledges the problem underlying hi s phil osophica l com mence-
ment. If this problem is the "staning point" for hi s project. it is 
eq ual 10 that of finding the true "eIllnmce gate" to philosophy. This 
starti ng point is IIlready a problem. that of how to begin with 
philosophy. This prc>uppo,es that the act of philo,ophy is 
some thing peculiar co mpared 10 the "no rmal " execu ti on of life. 
This issue. underpinning hi s philo;ophical enterpri,e. can 
be termed the epistemological problem. From here , Husse rl 's 
philosophical development moves from a descriptive phenom-
enological psychology to a systema ti c univer~al "sc ience" in a 
transcendental regi~ter. As such. the problem of en tering this 
emergent science is not a ladder to be thrown away o nce c limbed. 
Rather, " the problem of entry" is part of the phenomenological 
method itself. 
Avoidance of a lapsing back into an immanent reconMrllct ion of 
Husserl 's theory of the reduction necessitates a preliminary sketch 
of the epistemological problem which led Hu sserl to perform the 
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transcendenta l redu ction. T he epi ste mological framing of the 
problem o r intrOducing phenomenology will lead to an ex plication 
of the fund amental fo rm of life, the "natu ral alt itude". It will 
become apparent thai it is not onl y a problem of leavillg this life 
form in order to make one's way into phenomenology. It is in itself 
a problem of Lhemati zing thi s "pri ma l" altitude, and in do ing so 
one is a lready performing the first step of the reduct ion. From 
there, I shall di scuss the different ways into phenomenology. While 
th e e poc he deal. with overco ming th e natural a ttitude, th e 
methodica l problems of makin g a concre te way into the trans-
cendental " realm" only begin . One can di scern Ihree major ways 
into phenomenology and show a ce rtai n systematics in th eir 
unfo lding . In the thi rd part , I w ill di scuss the meaning the 
reduction has for Hus;er!. It has essenti ally two consequences that 
stand paradi gmatica ll y as the mea ning Husserl a ttr ibutes to 
transcendental phenomenology. However, I want to assert criticall y 
th at in these two di rec tions Husserl has fa iled to show the ir 
syste mati c connecti on. Ultimately. we are left with two " loose 
ends" whi ch Hu. serl wasn' t abl e to ti e together. perh aps because 
this is ultimately impossible. 
I . THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM: T I-IE R ELATIVITY OF 
TR UTHS AND THE OVERCOMING OFTHE NATURAL ATrtTUDE 
The epistemologica l problem concerns true know ledge, and the 
means of atta ining it. This issue comes aboul precisely where it is 
noticed as a problem. Hence, one might as k, is know ledge eo ipso 
tru e knowledge? Th is depends no t onl y on the mean ing of 
knowl edge, but also on the contex t in which one e mploys know-
ledge. The sc iences represent one such fi e ld. The achievement and 
pursuit of true knowledge is vital to sc ientific practice and to the 
meaning of science. Whether one speaks of absol ute truths (i.e .. in 
mathemati cs or logic), or adequati on to truth (e.g .. in meteorology, 
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where truths can onl y be approximate) the value of a scie nce 
depends upon its reaching true knowledge. 
The sc iences. however. are not the onl y fi e ld in which know-
ledge is an issue. In opposi tion to the sciences. there is the "field" 
of pre-scientific life. The o rdinary performance of life is carri ed 
out in the life-H·orld. Wherea" the problem of "absolutel y true" 
knowledge seldom becomes a theme here, the question of truth is 
more crucial than one at first imagines. Picture e.g" the occurrence 
of a car accident. Imagine then the different "true stories" heard 
from different people involved: the drivers, a passer-by on the 
sidewa lk , etc. Especially when some intere"t is at stake (w ho 
assumes the blame for the acc ident ) one will hear entirely different 
"versions". a ll claimi ng the ·'truth". Husserl call s these "situational 
truths" and it is the task of a judge to ''j udge the truth" which might 
lie, a" one tends to impl y. "in the middl e." Obviously neither the 
notion of truth nor of knowledge are taken emphaticall y (thus. 
absolutely). The task of the judge entail s the "distillation" of " the" 
truth from different ;tories. The result is onl y an approximation to 
what "reall y happened", attempting to satisfy both panies. Truth in 
this sense is an ·'idea". 
In thi s exam pl e. "truth" is an issue o r rheto ric serving certain 
interests -and maybe even of ideology. There is no "absolute 
truth" about the event of the car accident. although multip le 
persons claim to have "true knowledge." despite contradicting each 
other. While here the j ustification for truths is debatable. there are 
other areas wherein we do talk of truth and true knowledge yet in 
an unemphatic manner. For exampl e. in the market place on a 
certain day one speak' of the "tru e" price of produce without 
referring to the "abso lute price". The vendors fix the price anew 
each day. It will be determined by different circumstances. Hence. 
the daily price of a fruit is its situational "truth" and. as such. it is 
debatable: one bargains over the indi vidual price every day. Thi s 
no ti on of " truth" is re lati ve to the situation . evertheless. thi s 
" truth" will have its "authority" and " rig idity" that is far off from 
mathematical ri gor. Likewise, knowledge of this truth is fashioned 
in a similar way. One ca lb the person ex perienced in empl oyi ng 
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these ~itllalional truth.., a good salc!o.pcrson or a good bargainer. 
Hu,serl also u,ed Ihe e\ample of the house to illU'irale that a 
single object can yield differing opinions without invalidating 
other~. What one perceives depends on who one is: (I real eM~IIC 
agent views the hou..,c as an object for !'<alc. an anist as a piece of 
arl. etc. Within each perspective. the,e "inlerpretation," claim 
..,ilUalional truths. However. none of thc"c person~ see.., their views 
(IS an interpretation. 
TilliS, in order for a siluational !nuh 10 he a Inllh. it must block 
out other contradicting truths. The truth of the ani,t is different 
from that of the real e<,[ate agent. Howe\ cr. they ha\ e their own 
·'right." bccau;.,c they do not stand in competilio" with one another. 
But why not. if there is contradiction between them" The an,,'er 
lies in the notion of interest. What "COIlMilules" a cenain situation 
as such. what mark, it as relatiye 10 other situations. i, that the 
pursuit of a certain intcrC\1 circulll''1cribc.., a situation and "con-
stitute," a self-enclosed domain. The illlerest determines the truth 
of the ,itualion. The interest of the real eslate agenl in selling the 
house determine, hi, situational truth. The arlbt. likewise. pUf>ues 
her own interest. 
Life in general i, hence a "life of interest". In thi, sel"e. life 
enlail~ LI Illultiplicity or intcrc:,ts. each creating a ~pecific situation. 
However. we musl not undeNand the situational "field" of an 
interest as exactly delineated. Rather, il has the character of an 
hori/on which can expand and narrow. yet never come~ La an end. 
Applying this structure to the situalions, we can say that the field 
of an illlerest does nO! end in that there is no principle limit to that 
which can rail in the field or interest. At the same time. these 
"field'" are ,elr-enclo,cd due to the operative interest. Situations 
arc not i!-.Iand~ in H sea. Rather. they arc horizon~ extending over a 
limiled stretch or field of being. As such, they arc essentially 
limited (greek "orf~eill). In Ihis sen,e. they also exclude each other. 
The metaphor or tinted eyeglasses best illustrates the manner in 
Wllich ,itu3Iion, differ and e,clude each mher. Seeing through red 
glasses make, green objects in\'i,ible. "herea, they will become 
vi,ible when seen with glasses of another color. This can be 
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compared lO Ihe fac i Ihal a silUalional allilUde blocks OUl Olher 
siluHtion:-" M oreover. the image seen currentl y remains the ~a l11 e 
despile dilTcrenl colorings of Ihe glasses. The objeci is in each case 
Ihe same; il is "raw bell1g" or "hylelic slOck." in Husserl 's words. 
In Ihe nalUral alliwde. however, we can never see Ihi s objeci in ilS 
purily . 
Perceplion of such purity would involve stripping the world of 
its interest. Yet, due to its illlen ti onal character, life always 
implements a ce rtain interest. There is no un-intenti onal life. and 
intelllionalilY always strhes toward fulfillmenr . The world has 
thu s a "face of interesl" (/Itleressellgesiclu) Ihal it always turn~ LO 
us in one way or anolher. Since il is e"enti all y a world of interests. 
one can g ive another notion to charac teri!e the world. If the 
execuLion of life occurs in a multiwde of si tuati ons. Lhen life 
becomes the siwation of all , iluations. or the horizon of all 
hori l.ons5. If this b (0 be morc than a meldlwsis eis allo geno.\'. it 
mu-,l have a concrete meaning. H ow doc:, one conce ive of a 
hori70n of all hori/ons'? 
Husserl aims at a notion of the life-world lhat caplUres the 
totality of life in it> multilUdinous facets . The life-world is the field 
in which life carries itself out; it is normal life in ils everydayness. 
Whether Husserl ca ll s lhi s complex phenomenon life-world or 
"nalural world-life", he alternalely cmph"si/es either the noematic 
(the world) or the noetic (the li ving) aspect. The noelic-noema ti c 
4. Thl .. neglect3 th~ pmblcm~ ll f pU3"ivity nnd ~clf-affcc ti\'it y. Bccau,c the 
con<.:eptulIl of lift' i .. COil "ide red here from the fJC"pcctivc of the natural atti tude. 
the topic .. of p,h~i\' it ) and ,,,::If-affectivity arc not gernwnc to this di3CU~!\iol1. For 
II n::L.:on'ltruction of thi" p~I" ... tVC. prc-~Ifft!cti vc life. cfr. D. ZMIAVt. 'The Fracture 
In Sc1f-Aw:lrcne ...... ". in: 7AII·WI. cd .. Self-ClI\"{/rnll'~\. Tt'lIIfJoralim (lIId AIIl!nt"-
DordrcchtlBo ... toniLondon 1998 (Contribution .. to Phenomenology 3-1-). 21--tO. a ... 
,""ell a .. : R. Kl"Ht-.. IIt1Herl~ Begri{( tier Pm.H1'iliil. ZUI' Kri l1 4 der pauil'l'Ij 
SWfliesn 11/ dt,,, GelU'II.\(·/ten Phllllomenololfle. Frelburg/Munu:h 1998 (Phiinomc-
nologlc. Texlc lind KOl1le\.h! 6) 
5. Crr. Hua XV. TC\l 14. pp. 196-218 (+ appendIX X I). cfr. 310;0 the c.:rillcal 
interpretation by Hut). K.: " ~h::.im\\clt. Fremdwclt . die clIle Welt". in: Phtino111c-
no1ogt'chc FOI'<.;chullgcll 24/25 ( 199 1). pp , 305-.'\37. 
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struclUre designates the correlational a priori in its universal forrn6 
It signifi es the essenti al relatedness of world and conscious life. 
The correlate to the life-world is the mode of living in which this 
life-world is the horizon for any kind of action: as such. the 
correlale 10 the life-world is the "natural atlitude"7. 
In allempting to enter the sphere of philosophy and to assume a 
philosophical point of view. one has to relinqui sh Ihe natural 
altitude. However. it is not clear why Ihis would be necessary. Are 
there compelling reasons for "overcoming" natural life by the 
philosopher? Furthermore. what do nalUral and philol>ophical 
designate here? Husserl intends an adaptation of the ancient 
distinction between d6xa and epis/hlleS. However. he assigns a 
specific "modern" interpretation to it. loca lized on a higher level 
than that of "mere" pre-philosophical naivete. opposed to "mere" 
crilical reasoning9. 
Husserl conceives of the nalUral in opposition to Ihe philo-
sophical attitude. This opposition echoes the di stinction between 
pre-transcendental and transcendental landpoints as the modern 
version of the d6xa-epis/ellle di . tinction . The transcendental lurn 
anticipated by Descartes. and taken by Kant. occurs via the 
realization of the subject-relativity of Ihe world. Further, the lUrn 
to the subject. the "reduction" to the ego (cagita) bccomes the 
foundation supporting the edifice of science. The world is not an 
"absolute being" but is relative to the experiencing subject. All 
6. efr. Kri.\;,'i, * 46. pp. 161 f.. and ibid .. pp. 169 f., footnote; Cr;.\';s. 
pp. 159 f.. ibid .. 166 r .. rootnote. 
7. efr. Husserl '~ first account of the ntltuml altitude in Ideas I. §§ 27 ff .. as 
well as his laler. morc elaborate analyses in the munulicript material. publl~hcd in 
!-Iua XV. 3!'t well a~ in the Crisis. §§ 34-37, 
8. rr. KriJiJ. § 44. pp. 158 r.: Crisis. pp. 155 rr. 
9. Whereas Hus ... crl employs d(ixlI and ep'Sfet"e to characterile the 
fundamental nature of thi .. distinclion - and hence the radically new nature of 
phenomcnology- . he ~pcaks of "Neusliftungen" over against the ori ginal primal 
inMiluting~ in early Greek thought: efr. Hila XX IX. Text no, 32, pp. 362-420. 
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experience is worldly. bUI world is alway, an experienced world lo 
Thus, Husserl illlerprcis Descartes' turn to the subject and Kant 's 
tran scendental philoso phy as rudimentary forms of his 
transce ndental turn that anticipated hi, co nception of a 
correlational apriorjll. The realization of the essemial subjecl-
relatedness of all worldline>s necessitate, this transcendental turn. 
Why is this transcendental turn idemical with lea>i ng the na-
tural altitude? The natural altitude knows nothing of this 
corre lational apriori. The distinction between world and natu re 
illustrates the meaning of the "'naivele" of the natural altilude. 
Because the natural altitude knows ncither of thi s subjec t-
relatedness nor of its life a .. guided by a certain illlerest, it lives in 
the belief it can percei ve the world as Iiali/re . As previously shown. 
however. Ihis is impossible within the natural attitude. It implies 
Ihe illusion of seeing Ihe world stripped of any imerest, whereas 
any situation within the natural attitude is governed by "interest", 
However. this is not to say th at it is impossible to gain an 
"unilllerested" view. Quite to the cOlllrary. the recognition that all 
situation, in the natural atti lude are guided by subjective illlerests 
is already the essemial step beyond the natural attitude. Yet. the 
elemellls that moti vate the turn to the subject are already prese lll in 
the natural attitude. 
Understanding the subject-relatedness of a ll experience leads to 
the overcoming of the natural altitude. which is immersed in the 
horizon of special interests. Thus, the epistemological problem 
consists in being blind to the correlativity of world and experience. 
The distinction of d6xa and episleme "translated" into the modern 
situation of philosophy means : Philosophy which believes it can 
1 O. J-Iowc\cr. HU~'icr l lIu,i,!.., that (hi !. vcr.;ion of lran\cendcntal philo:iophy i ~ 
nOI an idcali~m in the form of. c.g .. Berkcky (Kruis. pp. 88 r.: Crisis. pp. 86 1".). 
which denies lhe ex, ... tencc of the external world. 
11. He also commend ... the British Emplricilil!oo in their development of 
n I,cientlfic psychology. HO\~evcr. a~ for the development of a lran,cendentul 
philo~ophy the decisive figure ... of modern phllo~ophy are the one~ mentioned 
l.lbovc. efr. the schema Cairn ... draws up aflcr a cOlwcr ... ,uion with Husserl. In : 
D . CAIRNS. COII\'ersations with /-Ius\er/ lind Fil/k. Den Haag. 1976 (plutcno· 
menoiogic;] 66). p. 1 ().t , 
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operate on a "reali stic" level i, bound to the nawral alliwde. As 
such. it cannot claim to be critical in the Kantian sense. This is not 
onl y Husser! '; critique o f pre- transce ndental philoso phy. It is 
e.peciaIly hi s critique of hi s pupil s who neglected to pursue the 
transcendental path that Husserl had taken up with Ideas I ( 19 I 3). 
This framing of the epistemologica l problem motivates the way 
into phenomenology. whi ch is identica l with rea li l ing the limits of 
the natural altitude. As such. phenomenology for Husser! is neces-
saril y transce ndelll al philosophy, which ent a il . adhering to the 
subject-relatedness of all ex perience. 
2. THE PERFORM ANCE OFTHE REDUCTION: 
THE MAlI>: PATHS INTO THE REDUCTION 
Husser! conceived several ways illlo the reducti on. The number 
of these ways has been subj ect to debate. or greater importance. 
howeve r. i, Husser! 's be lie f in the systemat ic order of th e 
reducLions. Within thi s sys tem~ll ics . none or these ways devaluate. 
rather. they expli cate. Clarify and co mpliment each olher. Hence. 
the reconstruclion I propose aHempts to adhere to the systematic 
order HlIs~erl envisioned while disregarding the temporal order in 
which he di scovered them. Legi timi Lation of thi s di sregard owes to 
Husserl 's assertion th.H lhe Cartes ian way rC lai n~ its '"right" and 
"validit y"12 despite the problem, Husser! sees wi th it. 
a) The Cartesian Way 
If the reducti on. in leaving the natural alliwde. is not an 
imposs ible endeavor, then there must be ce rtain "proto- forms" of 
pUlling the normal pursuit of life out of acti on within this primary 
11. err. N U(I XX IX. PI'. ~25 r. Thi" pa<;'\:.tgc wi ll be di<;cu'i"ed <;ub .. cquently. 
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"'lat(: of life. Hu~~cr1 u ... e ... a ~implc example or ... uch a proto-form: 
lhe suspension of judgmenl lWO people will praclice whcn in 
discordance wilh one anal her. If bOlh arc unsure of lhe lrUlh of 
lheir judgmcnl', lhey will suspend il. unlil lhey have found OUI lhe 
lrulh L1. On ly when one a'Scrts lhc lrulh of lhe judgmenl hilherto 
uncerlain, will il again be PUI inlO aClion, In lhe lime belween 
doubl and confirmalion lhe judgmem ("il is so") is "brackeled". 
When Hu"erl labels lhis brackeling epochI', il shall suffice 10 
remind lhal he lakes il over from Ihe Skeplic lradilion l4. In a 
similar sense, Descane>, melhod in his Meliilllliolls i, likewisc 10 
be understood as an epoch': in so far as Ihc decision 10 "once in his 
life" overthrow all knowledge i, equall) a radical "'lep back" from 
everyday life. The queslions of how and why lhe Canesian Epoche 
is Ihe firsl way Hu"erl uscs 10 imroduce lhe rcduclion is of great 
importance. When he Imer IISCS lhe lerm "reduclion" for lhis 
melhod as a whole, he see ms 10 want 10 idenlify bmh slCPS of 
epoche and rcduclion. This blu" certain nuance, lhal one mighl 
want 10 rewin bel ween lhem for Ihe sakc of clarifying the delails of 
lhis mClhod . In addilion, il is only from his Imcr undeNanding of 
lranscendental ,ubjeclh ily Ihal lhe reduclion can becomc more 
dominanl in lhc de\elopmCnl of lhis melhod. How docs lhe Epoch" 
comc aboul? 
The nalUral allilude consisb in viewing lhc world as "nalure," 
hcnee as exisling independenl of an experiencing agent. II believes 
lhal lhe world esis" whelher il is experienced or not. Thi s belief 
11 err. CAIRl\\. dr. footnnt~ 19. pp. 11 f.. where thl" eX~ll1lrlc 1\ m~nlioned. 
1-4. efr. III Lt>. "lIu..,<.,crl-. Rudgang aul dn ... plwillli/ll('tIOlI uml ule 
~c ... chichl lichc Stcllung der Phill1ol1lcl1ologic'·. 10: PhiU/olllcllolognc/u' FonduUlx 
10 (1980), 89-145. -l\kncn ... hal., exami ned Hu, ... crr .. relallon to the Skeptic 
tradition and ha.., argued thai IIll' .... crl take ... a po ... ilion between ... J...cpllci"m 
(or t:ritici .. ml on the one hand and l.I tendency 10 ullimate roundationali"1l1 on the 
other. At the ... ame IIIne. Merlen ...... hO\\ ... that Hu .... "crl ha ... a very limited vicw of 
the hi ... toric ... cumg .1\ \\ell ,:,,",cmi.luc pOIcmil.l1 of SJ...cptici\m. efr. K. MERTE\;S. 
briu-ht'll U-'I:'l iJl'gnifllJIIIIg lIIIlI Ski'/I\;,\. Krili\cht' Umenudlllllge/l ::'11111 5,,11I.\/I'er· 
,\flillt/Il;' tier IratH:l'lIdI'111alet/ PhiilIOIIIPIW!Ogll' Edmul/d HU\\l' r/\, Frclburgl 
Munich. 1996 (Orlm Phaennmcnolngicu,", VI/I), c!-.p. pp. 66- 1-l2. 
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Husser! calls the general Ihesis of the natural attitude l5. This 
"belief' is describable as a constant anonymous "yes-saying." It is 
comparable to a constalll sound which the ear blocks out. In 
HusserI' words: " It is. after all. something that lasts cOlllinuously 
throughout the whole duration of the Inatural] attitude. i.e .. 
throughout natural waking life"16 Thus. the epoche as pUlling the 
general thesis out of action. can be ,een as making explicit this 
constant base line "below" the " natural" hearing level. As such. the 
epoche docs in no way devaluate or negate it. but rather puts it out 
of action momentarily in order to pay attention to that which 
remains unbracketed . 
In Ideas I. Husserl insists that this bracketing is a malter of our 
perfect freedom. i.e .. the freedom to inhibit what we want to and to 
the extent we walll to do SOl7 He later considered both elements 
("how" and " to what extelll"j of thi, "freedom" as problematic. 
First. where does this freedom come from? If the natural altitude is 
this self-enclosed field of everyday life. then why should. and how 
cOl/ld it be left by bracketing it? Secondly. even discussing the 
possible extenl of the validity of the general Ihesis gives rise to an 
understanding of it as a field with a greater or smaller scope 
- ultimately that the field of the general thesis is like a continent 
within an oce'ln. The very fact of disclIssing a larger or greater 
scope misconstrues the radicality of the epoche. which supposedly 
"with one stroke" puts the general thesi s out of action. 
The General Thesis of the natural allitude pervades every form 
of life. since all life is guided by a certain interesl and hence 
affirms being. PUlling this life-pulse of continuous asserting Ollt of 
action can only occur as totalizing act. There is either being ill or 
Ol/l of action. However, whereas thi s radicality in fact calls for an 
equa ll y radical motivation. this rigid "eilher or" neglects the 
character of Ihe "yes" of the general thesis and the possibility of 
15. err. idt't!1I I. § )0, p. 52: Ideal I, p. 56. err. al~o Hua VIII. PI' . 4+50. 
where Hu~serl formulale, the "contcn!" of the GCIlt!rai Thc!tis a~ "the world i ... ·· 
("Die Well i.H."). 
16. Ideell t. § )0. p. 53: arter Ideas t. p. 57. 
17. Idee" I. p. 54: Idea,\ 1. p. 58. 
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"breaking its spell" . It is a "yes" wilh rcspeCI 10 the character of Ihe 
world taken to be "existing", but this world is to be understood as 
always existing in a manifold of ways. This refers to the multitude 
of special worlds as being li ved through in the natural alt itude. 
How can it at all be possible to bracket all these modes of living 
with one single stroke? 
Apan from Husserl's insistence that it is a mailer of our perfect 
freedom. a motivation for this step lies precisely in the relati vi ti es 
of the situationa l truths. If all of these are mcre ly truths for 
themselves and if the philosopher's aim is to rcach "absolute" 
truth. then it wi ll seem plausible 10 refrain from asserting any of 
Lhis. This very rea lization can already be seen as brackeLing. since 
understanding these relativities as relativities already overcomes 
being immersed in Lhem. The si Luat ional truths can only consider 
themselves as Lruths if Lhey Lake Lhemselves to be ab olutely Lrue, 
where in facL, Lhey are only relalive. The relativity is determined by 
not knowing about their silllationa l charac ters; only because they 
do not know this, they take themselves as "abso lute". Not bei ng 
bound LO the situaLions means already havi ng lefL Lheir realm. In 
thi s sense, leaving these situaLions behind and pUlling the va lidity 
of situational truths out of action are the same. 
The metaphor of the brackeL is yet more complex, involving 
two sides: Lhat within the bracket and that WiLhout. Following Lhe 
example of a doubLful judgment one does not consent to: Lhe 
judgment wi ll on ly be put back into action when one has 
"ev idence" about ils trllth . YeL, the brackeLs can on ly be removed 
by an I which lUIS evidence and hence asserts (or modifies) the old 
j udgment. The meLhod of brackeLing necessarily reverls to the Ego, 
which is the executor of any aCL directed aL the world. Thlls. the 
"lIIethodic expediel/t"'" Husserl takes over from Descartes -who 
carried it OUL "for an en tirely different purpose" 19- does not have 
18. Itll!e" I . 54: after Idem I, p. SR. 
19. Ibid. tn facL. Husser! poinll<l OU I. that Descartes ()vcrcmpha~izes an 
element of this doubt which i~ not only contrary 10 Husse rl' ~ Ihru ~t but b 
also ulLimalcly a mislead endeavor: "In De,carles. lhi !. part Isc. of doubting as 
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the function of nullifying or negating the general thc!-'is. but rather 
or motivating the turn to the subject which is the origin of the "cts 
directed "t the world, 
This is Hus~cf'J's main inlerel",t in the proCC~\ of brnckcting: the 
brackets arc set in order to determine "hat can be left "without", 
The universal doubt leaves over the doubting agent. hence a pure 
Ego stripped or any worldly meaning, and it is only thi s Ego that 
ca n claim for itself absolute evidence, What is left over in radical 
doubt is the transcende ntal ego, Thi, consciousness is the totality 
of the field of intentionality, whi ch is the correlate to the world 
given in intenti onal "cts , As such, this subject can not be a psychic 
enti ty in the world as my "spiritualit y", but consciousne" as such, 
In thi , ,ense, bracketing the totality of the world nece"arily entails 
bracketing my ego as part of the world, What is left over is not. as 
Husserl self-c riti cally puts it in the Cartesia" Medillllill" ,1 from 
193 1. a "/(Ig-e"d oj Ihe ,,'or/(r20• the mundane ego practicing the 
Epoche, Rmhcr, the epoche reveals the pure ego. consciousne" as 
such. standing opposed to the world. which I '" human being have 
acccl",\ to by reflection . In order to churacteriLC lhi'J curious 
"dua lity" or egos and to diqinguish them more clearl) , Hu sserl 
introduces the doctrine of the splitting of the ego, which I shall 
discuss in the following section, 
The strong emphasis on the ego as the expedient of epoche 
indicmes that there might be several motivations to practice the 
r~duction , The strongest one Husserl w~cs up from this Cartesian 
impetus is that of finding a basis from which to found apodictic 
evidence in the ,elf-evidence of the ego, However. it is not yet 
clear how one is (0 rc~c h ,t new scicnlilic di ... cipline from this b(l~b 
"out,ide the world", In fact. is not thi s claim of a non -worldly 
subjectivi ty a metaphy,ical construction, does not thi s very step or 
reverting to ,111 ab~o lllt c ego lapse back into a Platoni~lTl?ll Ilu~se rl 
negatlflgl i" \u predummant Ih<.ll Olle- C~1n .... t) that hi ... allcmp' to doubt uni\'cr,ally 
j, proper!} an ::lU~mpt to IlCJPIIt: uOIH ..... i.III)·· (It/C('fl I. p. 57, aher Idem I. p. SK1. 
lO. Carlt!~ialll\('''t.' MetillmiOlf('II. p. 63: after C,,"'('\/llfl M edllllllwu, p. 2 .... 
21. Th. , ·· ,dc:.lli'lic· · or ··p luwni\tic·· IIllcrpn.:lalioll W<I' quite pnpUl:lf in Ihl.! 
n::u.:llon of lIu"crr .. C~lIl[ cll1(lorari c ... alkr the publlc,II10n of Ide(l,', For "Iud 
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never gave lip Ihe claim of having laid Lhe fOllndalion of phenome-
nology on this Cartesian basis . Yel. il is difficult explaining how a 
philosophical sc ience could be "denved" from this absolule Ego. In 
order 10 show Ihis. Hu sserl's laler self-in lerpre lali on of Ihe 
Canesian wa) inlended LO show that Ihis way is merely one poinl 
of access among oLhers. Ultimale ly, however, Ihey all poinl back 10 
Ihis firsl path into Lhe Iranscendental sphere. 
Viewing Husser!' , philosophical developmenl after Ideas I. we 
ca n say Ihat the Cartesian way remained dominal1l before he felt 
forced 10 broaden Ihis approach. As we shall sec in Ihe following 
,eclion. his insights il1lo Ihe sphere of Iram,cendenla] consciousne" 
made il necessary 10 mOdify his way inlo Ihe reduction . However. 
Ihis modification was in no wayan abandoning but ralher the 
extension of Ihis firsl way. 
b) The P.I,I'chofogicaf Wi/I' 
The Ca ne>ian way was inLroduced 10 secure a field of apudiclic 
evidence, and, as such. to create a foundalion on which apodiclic 
~nowledge could be buill. Up uillil Cartesiall MediulIio17S (1931), 
Hu"crl emp loys Descartes' image of Ihe tree of knowledge, whose 
branches arc Ihe posilive sciences and whose Irunk is Ihe unifying 
scienria 1/1I;" ersafis. Phenomenology purporl' to be Ihi, unifying 
science. In Ihis approach. "Cane, iani ,m" mean, that only ev idence 
of egoic experience can give Ihe ego "podicric evidence, where,,, 
experience of worldly el1lilie, i, doublful, deceiving, elc. Mundane 
experience can undergo moda li Lations. In other words, Ihe epoche 
as a turn away from Ihe world 10 tile realm of pure consciou,ne" 
was con,idered by Hus,erl in I deas I a" a move from trans-
a reading (:fr. c.g .. NalOrp', rc\<icw of 11/('(1\ frul1l 19 17/ 1M. publi..,llcd in Logo,\ 
(reprinted in : H. NOACK, cd .. I-/I/ \H'r/, Dann ... t:tdt. 1973. pp. J6-60), or more 
"'Ifongly CH'n Hcideg.gcr in hl ~ Marburg it.:clUn.' COllr-.. C from 1925126. 
efr. M III IDHi(iI R. Logik . Oi l' Fra .S!,(' IlCU II t!t'r Wtll/rlU!If (GA 211. cd. b} . 
W. Biemd. Fr.IIll..fun 1976. pp. 3 1- 125. 
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cendence 10 pure immanence22 The argumenl for thi . turn to 
"inwardness". as a bm,is for apodictic knowledge is the following. 
obody doubts the evidence of something given directly, in 
intuition. An external thing. a sensuous object, give" itself as itself, 
and is 10 be taken as such . The principle of all principles -to ''lake 
everything Ihat gives iu,elf in inLUition originarily [ ... J as what it 
gives itse lf. bUI only within the boundaries in which it gives 
itselr'2J- is stated preci,cly 10 support this claim. However. 
looked al closely, whal is seen of a perceptual object is merely ils 
front side facing me. The back side will always be hidden; as I lurn 
the object around to see it, back side. its from side will again be 
hidden. etc. An external object always gives itself in adumbrations 
and therefore the evidence of this object will never be absolute. To 
be precise: the manifest ,ide gives itself with apo<iictic evidence, in 
direct perception there can be no doubt about it. However, other 
unseen sides can alway, turn out to be different than anticipated. I 
will never see the totality of an external thing. the evidence 
regarding it will always be presumptive. Hence. evidence aboul 
transcendent objects will not be apodictic, only presumptive. Since 
we are searching for an absolllle. apodictic foundation. the external 
experience of transcendem objects docs not qualify. Immanent 
experience on the other hand docs not adumbrate it,elf. It is given 
apodictically alld adequately -or, there is no difference between 
bOlh forms of evidence. Only inner expcrience can be the basi, for 
apodictic knowledge, since there b no uncertainty regarding its 
evidence. "A /II ell /al process is 110/ adl//Ilbra/ed. 1 ... 1 Rather is it 
evident 1 ... 1 from the essence of cogitationes, from the essence of 
mental processes of any kind. that they exclude anything like that 
Isc. adumbrationsj'"24 
To be sure. there is no backside to the anger I feel (or the joy I 
have etc.). If inner experiences do not adumbrate themselve , this 
means that they cannot have a spatial extension. While the external 
22. In thi ... he i ... consi..,tcnt wi th the fir ... 1 prc\entation of the reduction in the 
1907 lec lUre ... on the Idea of Phenomenology: err. H/UlII. pp. 4 r. 
23 . /deen I. 51: after Idl!(H; I, pp . ..w f. 
24 Ideel! I. p. 77: afler Itll'lIS I. p. 90. 
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object I can only imagine seeing from its front side with it s back 
side unseen, the imagination itselr will be given direc tly and 
absolutcly. In other words, the lack of spatiality rega rding inner 
ex pcriences seems to be the criterion ror a lack or adumbrating. 
Whereas adumbrations are linked to spatiality. it will sound trivial 
to say that experience takes pl ace in time. Follow ing Husserl's 
anal yses o f lime consciousness one can say (hat the time "or" these 
expe ri ences is not ex tern al. natural time, but the time "of ' the 
ex periences themselves. Experiences are "given" in a temporal 
now in a "primal impress ion" within a conSlant now of lime 
consc iousness. Keeping with the image or thi s fl ow, ex peri ences 
"flow away" rrom my current living Now. Though retai ned within 
a cenain halo or "tail" rrom my present Now, the ex peri ence of 
somethin g recedes um il it va ni shes out of the periphery o r my 
"mental eyes ight " into the stoc k of my me mory. "Periphery" 
already connOles a cen ai n spat iality, namely a di stance from my 
presem Now. Thi s distance becomes apparent when an ex perience 
slips out of my retention imo memory, when I forget what I had 
just heard or thought. The very "act" or rorgetting questions the 
apodiclic evidence of inner experience. Nevertheless, one need not 
reach ror suc h strong examples. The "rading a lit" of experience in 
retenti on chall enges the claim of apodicticity in inner experi ence in 
its totality. Inner experience can even deceive me; memory mi ght 
be false or incomplete, etc. Having rull and total access to all fi e lds 
o r my consciousness would mean that the ego disposes over a 
divine consciousness. 
In terms or adumbrating. time ca n be seen as a cenain analogue 
or space in the sense that. just as the spatiality of an Object prevellls 
us from gai ning a rully transparent view or it, so the temporality o r 
li ved-experience, prevents us rrom ha vi ng the to tality o r 
con. ciou;ness ru lly and transparently. Since all actual experience 
is "had" in the lived presem, the temporally extended nature of our 
mental lire evades a complete overview. Because I view my mental 
life in the reflective turning-back, I cannot "step outside" of it. 
I will always have experie nces, also o r reflection, in a living 
present. and this present will move to an ever-new present from 
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whi ch prev ious ex peri ences will recede into reco llecti on. Husserl's 
own co ncept of time-conscio usness behind his back counters his 
own cla im 10 apodictic evidence of inner experience. 
Accounting fo r this subtl y moves Husserl away from the 
Cartesian mo tif of apodictic evidence o n the basis of ego cogi to 
and leads to the second entry path. p,ycho logy. Put otherwise, hi s 
in sight into the range o r ex tension of thi s cog ilo fo rces hi m to 
ex pand the sphere of the cgo. At the same time. one cann ot do 
without thc ego, for there muM be a synthesizing agcnt which binds 
the cog ittll iones logelher wi thin one stream of consc iousness. Thus. 
the form of ego cogi/o cogilQlU1I/ is the general in vari ant form of 
a ll consc io us life. The questio ns. then, wi ll have to be a) how to 
charactc rize thi s " fi e ld" o f cogi ta tioncs and, more im portantl y, b) 
how to account for it methodical ly. Husscrl has to give answers to 
two inte rrelated q uestions: what kind of analysis can there be of 
thi s pheno menal fie ld , lIlId how is thi s poss ible, if thi s field 
structure in its enti relY escapes the clai m for apoci icLic ev idence'? 
What is the theme of phenomenologica l research if the ego is more 
than an empty ego po le and how can onc access it appropriatc ly? 
How can one accouIll for consciou~ness if consciousness itself has 
a ho rizona l structure? 
From its incepti on in the Logical In vestigatiolls, phenome-
no logy endeavors to ana lYLe consc iousness. The "posit ive" di!,-
ci pl inc fo r thi s is, natu ra ll y, psyc ho logy. What phenomeno logy, 
however. aims at moving from facts about the human mind to 
essenccs, an ei detic science. Hencc. phenomcnological psycho logy 
is a verita bl e d isci pli ne pe rfo rm ed on the basis o f an ei de tic 
dcsc riptio n of conscious phenomena. S tructuring this disc ipline has 
it s own proble ms and diffi culti es (under the rubric o f e ide ti c 
vari ati o n). Sys tematica ll y carryi ng thi s out would (leI' se lead to a 
sc ience, the envis io ned phenomeno logica l psyc ho logy. Husserl 
devoted ex tensive research of how to carry out thi s task in a 
systematic fashion25. What is aimed at is a po~ ili ve science within 
25. Thi~ error! can be~t be ... een 111 the lecture cour,c from 1915. Phiillome· 
I/%giw:he Psyclw/ogie, J-/lla IX. 
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the who le o f the spi ritual sc iences (Ce isle."l'issel1sc//{/jl ell ) in the 
framework of which psychology woul d be fo llowed by the sc ience 
o f communal spirit (CellleillgeisI)16. However. thi s di sc ipline 
remains bound to the natural attitude. In o ther words. psycho logy 
enta il s thc thematization o f an e idetics of (worldly) consciousness. 
but not transcendental subjec ti vi ty. becau se psyc ho logy as a 
pos iti ve !-!c icncc rcmain~ blind to the transcendental dimension. 
Hence. Husserl has to show how phenomeno logica l psycho logy 
can mo ti vate th e redu ction from worldl y to transce nd enta l 
consciousncss. Or. whic h says the same. he has to ex plain why a 
pheno meno logica l psyc ho logy mu st necessa ril y lead to the 
lra n~cenden la l . 
Thi s mOtivat ion li es in the doctrine of the splitt ing o f the ego, 
which treats the problems arisi ng from ex panding the ego to a fi e ld 
structure. I I' consciousness is more than an ego pol e but a who le 
sphere o f consc ious li fe. then the qucstion o f the aget/ I carry ing o ut 
thi s di sci pline becomes press ing. The age nt Husserl ca ll s the 
"unpartic ipating observer"11. An overview of this sphere -which 
turns o ut to be a sphere of illle rsubjecti ve conscious life- harbors 
the danger of d isso lvin g thi s very agent whi ch stri ves to gain an 
uninhibited view over transcendenta l life. The life I ex perience in 
intros pecti on. however. is noth ing but the life o f the agem itse lf. I 
can o nl y attain it by intros pection. Thus. re fl ec tin g on o ne ' s own 
conscious life not onl y yie lds acce" 10 thi s consciou, ness. It also 
c reates the fo ll owi ng problem: how ca n I have access to thi s 
consc ious life as such if I can never step outside o f my indi vid ual 
sell"? How ca n I experi ence thi s spiritual region, which is not my 
reg io n onl y. without losi ng my indi viduality? I can inhibit the 
general thes is o f the natural altitude and turn to my co nscious 
inwardness. Bul how am I to characteri Lc lhe relationship between 
26. On the topic of "Gcmcin£cisl" cfr. H lw X IV. pp. 165-231. 
27. Thi .. notion i ... in trou uceu in the begi nni ng of the 201;, probably the 
cnrli e\, mcmioning i .. In be found in the lAlit/fIJI LeCfUrl! \' from 1922. A lrc;Jdy in 
the lect ure CQur.,c from 1 92312~ (ErMe Philosuphie) the term ~ec l1l~ well-
e~ lab l h hed and h;u. ih di ... ti nct mClJning: err. Hila VIII . pp. 116-13 1. 
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myselr, the observing agen!. and Ihal which I observe ir the laller is 
Ihe who le sphere of consciousness? 
JuSI as in any science there is a region 10 be observed and the 
observer. there must be the same structure in the case or phenome-
nological psychology. Only here we have the curious silUation that 
the observer and observed are or one and the same essence. Hence, 
an artiricial rupture, which splits the ego into an observer and a 
thematic field, can only allain this dirrerence or the same: it, own 
consc ious life. " In my li ving preselll I have in coex istence the 
doubled ego and the doubled ego act: thus the ego. which now 
cOlllinuously observes le.g.J the house, and the ego. which carries 
out this act: '1 am aware that I am continuously observing the 
house' 1".J"~8 In principle this doubling h:" no limi!. I can always 
again reflect upon thal which I have just observed and again reflect 
upon this reflection ill illjillilllm. I can always make the pan of the 
ego, which J reflect upon, patent whereas the reflective ego wi ll 
remain laten!. However, the reflection by a lalent ego will render 
the latent ego patelll, etc~9 This infinite regre" -which 10 Husserl 
is "undangerous"- reveal s the reflecti, e "1 can". Although the 
rellection upon yet another ego-pole teaches me nothing new, the 
possible "iteration" or rellection proves the reasibility of the 
relleetive faculty or consciousness. 
Whereas this itcralion adds no new ins ight il1lo the nature or 
consciousness, the splilling into the observer or conscious lire and 
consciousness itself can only occur as a radical spli!. a rupture 
within the originally unitary conscious lire." aive" lire has its 
breaks and ruptures. but i, overall unitary. Hence, the break with 
the natural allillldc in the cpochc is 10 be conceived as precisely 
this split between the philosophizing ego and that which it 
ob,erves, consciou",CSS itselr. The epoc he is nothing but a radical 
splillillg or the ego. Hence. the reflective ego is no longer under the 
~pell of the general thesis, but it reflectively lUrns its allention 
10 consciousness which is intentionally directed at the world. 
2K Hila VIII. p. 89. Ill} tran..,lation. 
29. For the discussion of p:ltcnt and latent Ego dr. 1-/11(1 VIII. pp. IJO-9:! . 
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An allCrnalive formulalion of "being direcled at the world b 
"being interested in it:-, affairs", From here, the term "uninterested 
observer" becomes unde"wndab le as laking a position in the 
particular sense of nOI being interesled in the general thesis of 
positing the world as existing in different ways. Husserl prefers the 
term "unparticipating" to describe the "status" of thi, agent as the 
term "uninterested" implies a potenlial indifference towards 
everything. To be ,ure. the observer is interested in knowledge 
about consciousness - he is interested in a way that the natural ego 
cannot be ·'imerested". A lternative ly, "unparticipating" suggests 
that the philosophiling ego does not assert the general thesis of the 
natural attitude. 
This splitting enables a view of the totality of conscious life. 
This is not a "view from nowhere" because I gain access to my life 
by distancing myself from il Ihrough this split. What can this lell us 
about the discipline of phenomenological psychology insofar as it 
is a poi11l of access to phenomenology' Is it necessary for it to be a 
lran!'-cendental di\ciplinl'? Ultimately. il has In he. However. it is 
possible to practice an eidetic science of consciousness. Here, too. 
there is the difference between an agent performing this science 
and the region this science themalizes. Likewise, we would equally 
have to presuppose a sp litting. Nevertheless. as long as this 
discipline does not inhibit the general thes is. it remains on the 
grou nd of the natural attitude as a positive scie nce. Hence, 
mundane consciousness thematizes itself a, part of the world. In 
the hierarchy of the foundational strata of nature and spirit this 
discipline thematizcs conscious life on the basis of nature. The 
"personalistic" altitude necessary to access it is an abstraction from 
the natural altitude which experiences the whole of constituted life. 
By contrast. transcendental subjectivi ty is not part of the world. 
but it opposes the world as the product of its constitution. 
Transcende11lal subjectivity is not ill the world: it cOllsTiTuTes the 
world . Only the splitting of Ihe ego makes plausible the possibility 
for the observer to have a transcendental experience while 
remaining a mundane ego. The ego is at the same time an object in 
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the world and a subject for tile world JO Alternatively. a phenome-
nological psychology. based in the nalUral altitude. is possible. The 
transcendental viewpoint. already accessed in the Cartesian way. 
clarifies that this discipline. as a positive science. remains 
incomplete and methodically ambiguous. A true phenomenological 
psychology necc",orily is forced to perform the reduction and 
move from a mundane into a transcendental register. Thus. pheno-
menological psychology and transcendental phenomenology arc 
"paral le l" discipline,. This parallelity. however. vanishes with the 
realiLaLion that this con"ciousness themati/ed is nothing but 
transcendental consciousness once one has inhibited the general 
thesis. Or. viewed from the side of the world. mundane conscious-
nes, is an incomplete "part" or "layer" of consciousness that. seen 
in its transcendental register. is not part of the world. but opposed 
to it in terms of the correlational apriori. Hence. a methodical con-
sideration of phenomenological psychology reveals "that the 
consiste nt and pure execu ti on of thi s task of a radical reform 
of psychOlogy had to lead. of itself and of necessity. to a science of 
transcendental subjectivity and thus to ib transformation into 
a universal transcendental philosophy".' I. 
Apart from viewing psychOlogy a, an entrance gate to trans-
cende ntal phenomenology or to conceive of psychology as a preli-
minary discipline before a lreatment of "consciousness as such", 
another result appear •. expanding the Cartesian way into a full-
blown transcendental di,eipline_ namely the unparticipating 
observer. Contrasted with the Cartesian approach. the establishing 
of this agent as "saving" the philosophi/ing agent from becoming 
lost within the vast field of transcendental. Ihe latler turns out to be 
Iranscendelllal intersubjectivity. Establishing this ob,erver retains 
the radicality of the Cartesian approach as it insist, on a philoso-
phizing ~Igent who practices lhi~ illlro~pection. but moreover tal-..e~ 
over responsibility for its own actions a, a philosopher. Not by 
accident is Sacra/i'.> Ihe archetype of a radical philosopher_ "ho 
30. Kn.I/.\. PI'. IH1 ff.: Crim. PI'. 17811'. 
31 . Kri\i .. , p. 203: ;.liter Crif( ,\. p. 207. 
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ha, fou nd the foundati on of all know ledge in h im,el)"u. For 
HUl,serl. pmcti ci ng radica l self- intro>pecti on equate, li ving up 10 
the ethi cal ideal of ,clf- rcspon,ibility. Thi s ex pli cit establi shing of 
th e philosophica l ob,crve r thu s opens th e path to "e thi ca l" 
con, iderati ons of the ro le of the philosopherl). 
The movement from the Cartesian approach to the way via psy-
cho logy enables Hu"erl to harmonize the 111'0 requiremenls which 
sati sfy hi, task of rad ica l and ri gorous sc ience. The first task is that 
0 )" foundin g a sc ient ific d isc ipline which phenomenology cl aims 10 
be - hence more than a foundation in an ego. rather a di sc ipl ine of 
the cog it ata of thi s cogi/() . The second requirement is th at o f 
li ving up to the "epistemo logico-eth icar' (erkellllllliseliliscil ) ideal 
of full y legi ti mi/ ing the action, of the philosopher. As such. this 
science presents an ideal fo r a ll o ther sc iences. The idea of ,cience 
as well as that of the scie nti st arc products of an eidetic vari ation. 
and hence appl y to all fac tual appcamnces of them"-
The way via psychology is and remains, howeve r, the grand 
path inlo phe nomenology. sin ce such a psychology leads neces-
sa rily into transcendental phenomenology. Psychology, as Husserl 
say' in the Crisis. is the "field of decision" for a correct framin g of 
tnt nsce ndel1la l phenomenology. To say it differentl y. the modern 
separation into psychology and transcendent'11 philosophy has led 
10 the fal eful ueve)opment in modern philosophy (e.g., psycho-
logism). Husserl ', tnm,cendenlHl phenomenology can be seen as 
nn effort 10 combine both strands gone al.tray into one transce n-
dental di sci pline. 
32. efr. lllw VII. pp. 91"1". 
33. For an account of the role of rc ... pon~ i bili I Y in lI us'il!rJ' \ philo\ophy, cfr. 
the conc i~e text from HH.I), K .: ·'Ev ldent. und VCr3l11 wurtung" in: M . FLE:.l SC IIi R. 
cd .. Phi/o.mphell t!e~ 20. Jahrillmderts. Darnl'"tadt 1989. pro 79-94 . A more 
CXlen'i lve treatment " to bl! fou nd 111 Fr. K LSH:.R. Wege der Vel"{lll tworf'UlR. 
H II\H' rIJ Phiillom£'lI%l{ie 0/\ CUllg dltrf" die FlIkfi:.itii f. Dordrccht/Bo ... tonl 
London 1996 (Phacnomcilologicn. 138). 
34. Thi ... is HU'I,crr, path into phenomenology in (he Cartc~i:.ln (!) 
Mcditmion .... dr. e .. p. Cartl'sitllll'c'he M I'dilllfirmt'lI. ** 3-5. 
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c) The Way via the Life-world 
In his lasL aLlempL LO pre;enL an inLroducLion inLo phenome-
nology in the Crisis, Husserl proposes yeL anoLher way, LhaL via the 
life-world (Lhe onLological way)35. AlLhough he already pursued 
Lhi s paLh in his lecture; and research nOles, iL is nOl until the Crisis 
that iL achieves iLs mOSL mature presentation. WiLhout devaluaLing 
his previous ULlempts. Husserl considered this paLh the principal 
one. What arc its main line, of thought? 
InsighL inLo the naLure of transcendenLal consciou,ness reveals 
"the transcendental" to have essenLially intersubjective and a 
geneLic dimensions. SchemaLically. Lranscendental subjecLiviLy is 
expanded inLo Lhese LWO major dimensions: as a field of cons-
ciousness it is nOL "only" a subjecLiviLY bUI always already an inter-
subjecLiviLY. Furthermore. the description of Lhis Lranscendental 
field is incomplete if only ana lyzed in a ; taLic register. The ;tatic 
description turns out to be merely a stratum within an encolll-
pass ing whole of a geneLic development16 The combination of 
both expansions can be termed generaLive phenomenology37. 
Phenomenology in Lhis full sense as the theory of con;titution 
accounLS for how transcendental con ciou,ness forms the world. 
That implies that on ly a full undersLanding of this consciousness 
can give the philosopher a concept of the world as life-world. Since 
35. err. I. KI~RN. "Die drci Wcgc zur Ir:l"vendenwl-phlinomcilologischcn 
Reduktion in der Philosophie Edmund J-I usscrb", In: Tijd.\chriJt l'i)or Filmofle. 
Bd. 24 (1962). PI'. 303-49. here pp. 327 fL Unlike Kern. I differenl;"'" the way 
via the life-world proper frol11 Ihat via regional on{Ologie~. Whcrca~ Kern COUIl I~ 
thi~ path a\ belonging 10 the fonner. I consider it as beionglllg to the way via the 
po~itiyc "dence ... and as I;uch have I treated it a ... pan of B. Kern him ... elf says that 
the full notion of an ontology of the life*world \ ... "an idea of the laic H us~crl" 
(ibid .. 327) and it will be tre,lIcd accordingly a, the way Hu!. ... erl pur ... ucs in the 
Crisi.'i. 
36. efr. the imponant lext on "siatic and genetic method" in H IW XI. 
pp.336-45. 
37. The devclopment from Malic to gcncllc method and from genelic 10 
generative phenomenology il, dlscusscd in Stclnbock', Home and BewlI/d, 
Generative Phenomenology after Hus ... erl (Evan~LOn. 1995), 
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transcendeillal consciousne,s as world conslituting and Ihe life-
world as the product of constitution are correlatives, thematizing 
either oj them offers a way into phenomenology. The way via 
psychology and that via Ihe life-world complemelll each other. 
Whether I take my point of departure from consciousness in the 
mundane sense and reduce to its transcendeillal "counterpart" or if 
I inquire back from the pre-given life-world. in both cases I arrive 
at transccndental (inter-) subjectivity as the ultimate. "abwlutc 
being" which constitutes the worldJ~. 
If inquiring back into transcendental consciousness reveals the 
world as what it truly is -a product of the transcendental 
constitution- only then can transcendental phenomenology render 
a real understanding of what the world i". i.e ., a life-world, 
constituted by a totality of monad, . In other words. as long as the 
world is not analyzed in this way, it has not been fully understood. 
This is also a critique of the positive scicnces. It is not such much 
that they have given up their ideal to account for the essence of the 
world (otherwise they would make no sense) as much as they have 
pursued a wrong path. In so doing they have been blind to the true 
being of the world in so far as they have abstracted from it and 
have forgotten its basic character. This is the main theme in the 
Crisis, where Husserl tries to make a statement diagnosing his time 
and to show how transcendental phenomenology can help solve 
this crisis. Thi, "missionary" mOlive of Husser!'s philosophy goes 
back to the Kai:o-Artic1e from 1922, in which he calls for a 
"renewal" of the European spiritJ9 When some 15 years later he 
diagnosed a "crisis" in modern European culture, he reverts to the 
same motive. In both cases. one can reduce the solving of the crisis 
38. On the que ... tion of the ·'ab ... olutc bemg" of Iwn,cendentaJ "'UbJCCli\'iIY 
dr. HIIlI VIII. pp. 497·506. and Landgrebe'., \\or"' .... c'p. "Mediwlion tiber 
Hu .. ,erl!<. WOri "OIC Ge ... chichtc 1\1 gro6e .... akwm de, ab ... ohllen eim,", in: 
Fakli:.!tlillllllll"dh'id,w/wlI. Humhurg. 198:2, pp. 3X·57," 
39. Only two of the rhe KlIi:.o arlicle~ were publi\hed in the Japanese 
journal "The Kai zo" (RcnC\\iil): Ihey have been publi"hcd <ts a whole III /-Ifill 
XXVII. PI'. 3-94. 
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to the formula: the world must be saved through rigorous science, 
this science ultimately being phenomenology40 
What does the crisis or mode rn European sc ience consist in? In 
. hon, it has moved away from the life-world by its method of 
mathematization. This process is thm of an ab;,tnlction which has 
converted the world into a mathemaLical univer~e",n. Two corre-
lati ve results follow: Firsl. sc ience abstracts from Ihe "rear' world 
and lives in its own world. in a world of formulae. Second and as a 
consequence. it loses sight of the orig inal life-world from which it 
emerges. In its abstractive move away from the life-world. science 
not onl y loses sight of it but it replaces it wi lh the scientific world. 
The life-world has become covered up by a scientific view of this 
world Ih al. in faci. does nO[ see Ihe world as what it is in its 
origina l sense: a world of pre-sciemific. pre-philosophical life. 
However. what notion of life is at stake here'? Is not the sciem ifi c 
form of life a very special and "dignitied" form? In what sense can 
the life-world, accordingly, be pre-scientific? 
There can be no doubt about Husser!'s unceasingly high regard 
for science. One must never understand his call back to Ihe life-
world as depaning from the ideal of a "scicntiric" mastery of the 
world. Only a crass misreading of Husserl's famous quole of the 
dream of rigorous science .Iending'· can intcrpret it as Husserl 's 
own opinion42 ", The phenomenological approach does lhcmati7c lhe 
world as a life-world bUI one of il s goals is 10 bring Ihe sciences 
back on Inlck. Thus. phenomenology does nol devaluale Ihe 
achievements of lhe posilive sc iences bUI wants to embed Ihem in 
40. A certain "missionary" IInpclus can :11'0 already be found in his article in 
L080\ from 1911. '·Philo~ophy u ... Rigornu~ Science"'· . And in rI certain ,en .. !:' 
already the Logical If/I'e.\·rigar;nl/s nwkc the claim ror u radical reform of 
psychology. and from therc the totality of science'>. 
4\. efr. the fll11101lS Galilci-paragraph in the Cri..,i~ (§ 9) for a detailed 
reconstruction of this process. 
42. efr. Kri.~i.\". p. 508: C,.;.\;\. p. 389. The ,UlIemcnt "The dream i ... over·· i ... 
mther a quOIc Husser! pUIS into the mouth of his opponent .... 111 which he ironit.:ally 
formulates the absolute antithesis of his own pO\ilion. efr. abo Carr's 
interpretation of 1hi" quote in hi~ tran,l:ttor"s IIl1roduction. Crisis. XXX r. 'IS well 
itS [he footnote 21 on p. XXXI . 
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an all-embracing !-.c icnlific l!ndeavor. AgiJin. what does Hu ... ..,crl 
mean with life-world '!,, ·l When he asserts that the sciences live in a 
world of abstraction, the c ru x i, Ihat they do nOl live in the world 
a, it is found in "ordinary" life. They live in the world of science 
thai is opposed to the pre-scielltific world. The life-world is hence 
the world of Ihe pre-' iel1lific allitude. It is nothing hut the world 
the natural allitude has as its corre late. It is the , ubjecti ve-relative 
world of <I,i_llI as opposed 10 Ihe world of episteme. Not only i, thi s 
world always already " leaped over" by modern _sc ience, it has 
never prec isely ill its pre-scientific characte r been the theme of a 
sc ie l1lifi c endeavor. lI owever, the pre-scientific life-world is the 
basis of all human actions. natural or scientific. 
Hence. it i the task of phenomenological renection fir;t of all 
to Ihemati ze thi s life-world. i.e .. to re-cove r it by uncovering the 
ab"ractive layers thai have become laid over it. Husserl ca lb for a 
" reduc tion lO th e life-world ". One must understand Ihi s as a 
reduction in the specific ;ense of an "opening up" because the life-
world has been forgotten hy modern man in "' Iri ving for a o.;cientific 
m'''tery of the world. Siric tl y spea ~ing. o ne ca nn ot ca ll thi s 
forgetfulne;.s. s ince it never was thcmatizcd in the first place. It has 
the character of a "primal dma". 
Paradoxica ll y. one must ca rry o ut this redu ci ng to the pre-
sc ienlific world as a scien tifi c endeavor aiming at a uni vcr~al 
"ontology of the life-world" +1. As such it would be carried out in 
the natural att itude. The natural attitude ha\ bee n under;lOod as a 
lower form of the transcendental attitude and ca n only "artificially" 
be re"ituted. This cou ld be interpreted as contrad icting Hu"eri ', 
own intentions in that he ~ccms 10 neglect the meaning of the 
43. The amwcr wluch will be gl'l'cn in the 1'0110\.\ IIlg 1\ but one read!!l!! of 
l! u ..... crJ' ... concept urlhe Id-c· ""orld. A.., Clm; .. gc .. ha ... ..,h(Nn. \C\craJ concept ... have 
gone into the forming of Ih., notion. Here. I will foell .. on tht: pre-..,cicnlific a\pcc! 
of It. err. U. CLAESGES. "Z""Cldcullglcih::n In Hu\ ... crl ... Lcbcll ... wclt-Bcgrifr,", 
(op .cit ., : a\ \\ell a~ R. B()I~ HM. "lIw ... erh drci Thc ... en tiber die Lcbcn,wcl!" 111 : 
E. STROKER (cd.). Lebemll'elr /1IIt! \vis,\(!lIsdflljr ", tiN PI/ilmopll/e Edmulld 
1i1H'~er/fij . Franlfurt. 1979. pp. 23-31. 
44 fr. Cri.d,\ , * 51. 
<>1 
SEBASTIAN LUFT 
reduction. However, one ha, to insist thut first seeing the life-world 
as such ("s tripped" of idealizations) owes to a reduction . This "life-
world reduction" reduces to the world before any idealiLations and 
reveals the sphere of basic life that is the "presupposition"45 of any 
acti vity46. 
The idea of an o ntology of the life-world has been o ne of the 
1110St fruitful ideas in the late Hu sser!. What thi s ontology consi"s 
of and how it i, to be carried out, sha ll not be discussed here. 
However. this di scipline is important in our context. because it also 
yields a way into thc transcendental once we realize that the life-
world is a produc t of com,titutio n. Indeed, this concrete world of 
the natural attitude cannot come in to view if we do not practice a 
univen,al epoche from thi ' natural att ilude in order to thematite it. 
-15 err. K,.;si.~. p. 105: CriJi\. p. 103. 
46. Where,.\'t 11 b known thai Hus .. erl III tr)ing w rc\eal thi~ Ilatural Iifc-
world i ... innuenced by A\'\!nariu..,' notion of the ""lIli/rhelle Weltbl'griJr. II 1\ 
hl\loricnlly inlcrc,>ling 10 mention lhat in a Ire.lIlllent of Avenanu!'>' philO'.ophy, the 
philo ... opher Leopold ZII:GU-R. in hl<; c\,·,ay "Ueber cinlge Begriffc dcr 
'PhJlo,ophie dcr relllen Erfahrung'" (0" Jome fUJI/om of 'phi/mop"" of !,ure 
experience'). in: LO.':'I,\ II. 1911111. IIcrt 3. pp. 316<\49. U'l,CS preci.-.cly the tcrm 
"reduction" to charac tcri/c the movement nccc\",ary 10 uncover this "world": 
"However. the pl~1Il of an intentionally ahi~ltJric.d comportment to the world i!'! not 
easily curried Ihrough. A brief rencction J1lU~t Ic.tch Ihe philo:-.ophcr the 
iml>O!'!!'!ibllily to ju~t simply think about the w()rlel. For what i\ lhe v. orld'! I .. , ) All 
of lhe ~uddcn a la~k of il\ own difficulty ari,c, before the thinker. That i't, to lead 
the "world" back l:,ufllckJI111reflllo "uch "Impll fied ha,ic notions. '0 Ihal It in II, 
IOtaillY become\ mantlgcable IIwl1lllichl (0 thought. manageable "umd'wiJlidd for 
hlllmm spiril. On Ihl\ fir,t reduction. which nccc",arily ha, to be carried through 
in the development of UIlY philo"ophy. depend, nOI only lt~ further conception 
IDllrc""i/eI/I/lgl. il"> organi/ntion: rather. il remain\ al .. o guiding lIJl'Stll1l1tl(,fldl for 
the relalionship and the cOlltradiction of ~cllO()l\ and directions , which hi .. lOry 
enumerates, The ~ll11plificaliol1, vio lcnt a., well a, 1Il3\Oldable. 01 the "all and 
everything" to original. complimenting Ilotion~ ,uch u, infinite and fini te, moving 
and resting, becoming ;lIld being. one and many. lemporal and cternal. bcing·for-
it ... elf and bcmg·for·u ... con ... ciou ... and ullconsciou .... bod) and soul. thlllking and 
being. state of affair ... IZIJ,wmdl and object (C<'gt'fI,Hlmd) - thi ... ,implification 
... how.., to the conal..,~eur [Kellnerl a multitude of ~YMcmatic account-. and 
hi.,torical philosophcmc .... which in all part ... arc governed by Ihe redUCllon of 
bcginllll1gs. Perhap ... no thinker but A\'cnariu ... ha ... ,0 much tried to make the 
effort. a., theorctica lly ull ... u'picioll ... ly a, po ..... iblc. 10 hreak rcnlity down into .. 
number of last basic notion ..... (pp. 316 r.. my tran'lI~lIlon). 
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We lIeed the reducti on to uncover the sphere of tran scendental 
subjectivity that constiWlcS this world as the world of the natural 
ani tude. from which any activity lakes its sland. Onl y by under-
standing the transcendental as constituting can we have access to 
the world in its base-function . i.e" as pre-philosophical life- world . 
In Dlher words, the red uction must even go beyond the philo-
sophical . tandpoim and the phenomenologi st has to make his or 
her way back inlo the natural aniwue. however without forgeuing 
its tran scendental ··origin". Husserl has called thi s reverse move-
ment "enworlding". 
II is only through a uni versa l epoche thm we can auain a full 
notion of the corre lational relationship between world and 
tmnscendemal subj ectivity. As Kern put s it: "only the ontological 
way hence grasps subjectivity really as transcendental""? Only an 
ontology of the life-world auains a view of the world in its 
uni versa l dimen sions. After all. also the world of the sc ienti st is a 
"world; ' even though it depends upon its un-thematic basis. the 
life-world . The world is thu s a universal foundation. The relativity 
of mulIipl e interests and different home-world s res ts upon 
transcendemallife as the absolute ground. 
Since transcendental subjectivity and life-world are correlates in 
the framework of constitlilion. gaining a full vision of either one 
illdudes the possibility of understanding the other: one COllll ot go 
without the other. Only from the standpoint of an ontology of the 
life-world can one practice the transcendental reduction . Likewise, 
only through a full analysis of the laHer in its broade .. t dimensions 
can we understand the world as the product of constitution and thus 
as what it ultimately is: a historic world of life with its genesis and, 
a; the region of all regions, a ground on which hi stori c "sub-
jectivities" have developed and can ever develop. Only from thi s 
perspective can phenomenol ogy ultimately thematize the lrans-
ce",lenw{ problem of hi story. It then becomes undcrstandable why 
Husserl in sists that the reducti on in no way mcans an impo-
verishment Or a "reducing" of the world to some singular trans-
47. KI·.RN.op. cit .. p. 344 (my Lran slation). 
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cendenlal ego. In rac!. the reduction opens up ;1 view o n the world 
by transcending the naivete of the natural attitude to a uni versal 
standpo in!. 
Furthe rm o re, the discovery of the genetic dimension of 
const itution revea ls the life-world to be not only historical but also 
to have its own "'laws o r genesis". Trac ing back. the hi story of 
the life-world in its decisive developmental steps -its primal 
institutings- reveals these as developments on the way to trans-
cendenla l phenomenology itself. The sketch or phenomenological 
"archeology" Husserl performs in thc first part of the Crisis in 
going back to the first rudimentary forms or mmhematization in 
ancient Greece is nothi ng but a ge netic reconstru cti o n of how 
science has come about in a certain historical situation. It is a 
reconstructio n of how it has arisen from the pre-philosophical lire-
world through a radi ca ll y new idea. the mcnhematization of nillure. 
But the re is a lso a "prog ressive' side to hi sto rica l analysis. 
Husser!"s reconstruction of the hi story of philosophy 10 modernity 
is also an effort to trace primal institutings by interpreting thi s 
hi story as coming ever c loser to the discovery of transcendental 
subjecti vity until it -in this very much like Hcge l- rcaches its 
dec is ive breakthrough in phenomenology. However, hi story does 
not sto p but rathe r proceeds from here in a new style. Thus, by 
inte rpreting history as a c riti ca l hi story o r ideas4B ha ving a 
teleo logica l development, it culminates in the reduction as the way 
into a transcendental reconstruction or the hi , toric life-world . 
To su m up, I have prese nted the three major ways into pheno-
menol ogy systematically. Although Hu sse rl never achieved a 
systemati c account o f these ways. he was convi nced that there in 
fact was an underl yi ng ~ys temali cs. In this sense. Lhcrc is uhi -
mate ly but o ne way which may have its different procedures or 
variati ons. the way through the life-world . I shall end thi , section 
with a self-critical quote. in one o r Hu s!.erl' s last manuscripts from 
1937: 
48. Thi ... j, the title of (he firq pnrt lIf (he lecture coun.c Ull ErMe 
Philwophie. 
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I have drafted different introduction, into Iranscendenlal -
phenomenological philo!.ophy .. . We shall see thai this life-
world (Iaken omni -Iemporally) is nOlhing bUI Ihe historic 
world. From here. il becomes conceivable thm a complete 
systematic introduclion into phenomenology begins and is to 
be carried through as a unive"al hi storic problem. If one 
introduces the epoche without the historic framing. then the 
problem of the life-world. i.e .. of universal hi story. still 
linger>. The introduclion in Idells does in fact retain its right, 
but I now consider the historical way to be more principal 
and ~ystcmalic"9. 
3. CONCLUSION A D CRITIQUE: TilE REDUCTION BETWEtN EGO 
AND liFE-WORLD 
In many characteriza ti ons and metaphors Hu!)!)erl tried to 
determine what he meant by the reduction. Hi s sometimes em-
phatic or even ceremonious formulations make it clear Ihat he has 
more in mind Ihan just solving a specific epistemologica l problem. 
Or rather, the epistemological problem in its full dimensions is of 
such importance that solving it is comparab le to a full conversion 
of humankind . However literally these comparisons are to be 
understood. Husserl ma~es it clear in many lellers in the last 
decade of his life that he considers the reduction his greatest 
discovery and he is convinced that it is also the most difficult part 
of his philosophy. and thal "t he reduction" is much morc than a 
purely methodica l de' icc. At times it becomes a synonym for the 
e"ence of his philosophy. Let us look al the consequences to 
which this method leads. 
The di,cussion of the ways into the reduction ha, shown that 
there are 111'0 focal points the reduction leads 10: the life-world as a 
constitulional product of the full ,cope of the lranscendental. on the 
49. Hila XXIX, pp. 415 r. (my Ifilll' .. lalion). 
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one hand . and Ihe ego Ih al. as Ihe un pan ici pmin g observer o r 
transcendenlal lire. is Ihe basis ror apod ictic evidence. on the other. 
Wh at a re Husser)' s inte nt io ns in roc usin g on th ese two 
phenomena? 
Lei us stan wi th the ego o r the phenomenologist. Establi shing 
th e observer o r tran_ce nde ma l li re in the very proce" o r 
constitlll ing the world places the ph ilosopher in Ihe posit ion or 
accounting ror this transcendental lire. Thi s agency is always and 
in lhc last instance "my own" lire. Accounling fo r it is more than 
an epistemological task. Since the phenomenological sc iemist has 
to leg it imate her ac ti on" she is guided by a lhemati c "baseli ne," 
responsi bi lity. Accou ntin g ror one's ow n dee pes t "self ' is more 
than j usl perrorming another scientiri c "job"; it is a tas k o r the 
hi ghest responsibil ity. The "dignity" or Ihe philosopher's ac ti vity 
stems from hi s duty to act responsibly as a researcher. In rac t, 
"acting rightfully" in doi ng philosophy is so much an elhical issue 
that one cannot conceive of philosophy as being o nl y a "job." It is 
rather a "vocation". In thi s Hu sserl makes use or the German Bel'll! 
Uob) as deri ved from BeruJilllg (vocation}so. Being a "good philo-
sopher" is an ethi cal idea l. This does not mean that everyone ought 
to become a philosopher. However. becoming one means not o nl y 
achi ev ing the hi ghest dignity hu manl y possible but a lso livi ng 
humanness. which consists in rati onality. to the rull es t. Becoming a 
philosopher as the one who has pe rrormed the reducti on and 
di scovered absolute lire "wi thin" him- or herself. means rulfilling a 
"self-rormin g or the ego through absolute ren ection 10 the abso-
lutely genu ine human"si. 
Becoming a ph ilo,ophcr as an idea l tas k equal s that o r jus-
tirying all or one 's actions and taki ng responsibility ro r them. This 
50. err. ' hw XX IX. p. 353 (m)' lran ... hllion): "1<.; 'vocallon [Bend/II/g] :In 
empty word? lI a, a philosopher e\er [ ... \ been a 'genuine' philosopher wilhollt 
the dCllloni,m of \"ocationTlc ...... '? b phi lo,",ophy to the genuine philo..,ophcr u ... a 
random ... o·(ulled life·occupation I Lcbcn\bcrufj. 1\ it for him nOl rather falc. 
which for hlnl h'h decided over ocing and non·hcing?'· 
51. "Selb!<.lgcslaltung de .. !eh durch ab ... olutc RcOcxioll lum absolul echlcn 
Menschen" (A V 5/ 16b). 
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lies with in the teleology of human (rational) faculties. If practical 
rat ionality is a questi on of freedom, then the philosopher' s ac ti ons 
in her "phenomenologizing" acti vity are a genuine pur uit of free-
dom. Moreover, she is even more "free" since she has become 
aware of thi s freedom as be ing a full instantiation of rationality 
di scovered in leaving the boundaries of the natural attitude. 
Yet, the transcendental life I di scover within myse lf through the 
reduction is more than my own life. The reducti on teaches precisely 
th at transcenden tal achi eve ments never belong onl y to me; the 
world is never a produ ct of my acti vity alone but of a trans-
cendental intersubj ectiv ity. Subjectivi ty becomes formed onl y in 
terms of others, the ones before me and after me, the ones I have 
never encountered and never will encounter, etc. Thus, the reduc-
tion g ives access to transcendental life as such, breaking the spell 
of solipsism in opening a path 10 the other. In and through trans-
cendental intersubjectivi ty we are bound together in one spiritual 
tolality. As such, Husserl called the philosophers in the Crisis the 
" functi onaries of man kind" . They can assume this fun ction insofar 
as taking over responsibility fo r myself directly leads to all the 
o thers as united in the transcendental totality of monads. The 
philosopher has thus the do uble task. On the one hand he or she 
interprets th e li fe of hum ankind in an "abso lute" view. The 
philosopher in hi s activ ity of di scovering the truth has to g ive 
account (/6gol/ did6nai) for the actions of mankind in their relati ve 
ways of life and in the multitude of worlds li ved in . Gi ving a 
descripti on of thi life in thi s world is the first step to judging 
human acti ons. Thus, Husserl states programmatically in Cartesian 
Meditations. " phenomenOlogica l ex pli ca tion does nothing but 
ex pli cate th e se nse thi s world has for us a ll , prior to any 
philosophi zin g, and obviously gets solely from our ex peri ence 
-a sense whi ch philosophy can uncover but never alter. .. "52 
On the other hand, the philosopher's ro le is that of ca lling 
mankind back to its teleologica l path . Thi s is the ro le that the 
philosopher and ci ti zen Husserl took up in the Crisis at a lime in 
52. Cartesianische Mediwlionen. p. 177: after Cartesiall MeditatioliJ. p. 151. 
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whi ch not o nly science had devimed from the palh des ign:lIed but a 
who le nati o n had gone aSlray, be ing ca ughl up in a fre nzy o f 
nationali sm and racism. HusserJ 's calling for a reform of science in 
the li ghl o f Ihe pOlitical upheaval in Nazi-Germany mi ght seem 
very naive. H owever, one must bear in mind what the role of 
sc ience was to Husserl. Scientific and ultimate ly philosophi cal 
activ i ty are the highes t real iza ti ons of human life. In thi s 
"emph atic" sense the philosopher's role mi ght well be described 
wi th Ni etzsc he as a "doctor of culture". A "cri sis" can a lso be 
understood in medica l te rms as the c rest o f a sickness. Thus. the 
philosopher cannot directl y intervene in the course of hislOry - I he 
sense o f the world is one she ca n "never" a lte r. Rather. she can 
o nly reac t to a disease th at has already taken its course; i.e .. she has 
the duty to point out where and why, from which moti ves. thi s 
dev iatio n from the "good" palh has occurred and show poss ible 
ways out of the cri sis. 
However, despite the emphasis o n the phil osopher' s ro le o f 
standing for humanity, Hu sserJ ins ists on the " uniqueness" and 
"personal indecJinability"53 o f the philosophi z ing cgo. Fo r all o f 
hi s e mphasis upo n intc rsubj ec ti vity , the agent can neve r be 
"reduccd" to an irre levant mode within an inter-monadic tOla lity: 
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"The ''I'' that I alta in in the epoche. which would be the 
SHme as the "cgo" within a critical re interprc tation and 
correcti on o f the Cartes ian conception. is ac tually called " I" 
o nl y by equi vocati o n - tho ugh it is an cssemi al equi vo-
calion since, when I name it in rellecti on, I can say nOlhing 
other th an: it is I who practice the epoche. I who interrogate, 
a; pheno menon, the world whi ch is now va lid fo r me 
according to its bei ng and be ing-such. w ith all its human 
beings, of whom I am so rull y conscious; it is I who stand 
above all natu ra l ex istence that has meaning for me, who am 
the ego-pole o f thi s transcendemal life. in which, at firs t. the 
53. Kri.\i:L p. 188: aflcr Crisis. pp. 184 f. 
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wor!d has meaning for me purely as world: it i, I who. ta~en 
in full concretenes,. encompass allthat"5-I. 
Hu"erl's philosophy remains a critical transcendental philo-
,ophy that can never do without an absolute ego as foundation and 
staning point of all reflection. Even in a critical reinterpretation of 
the Cartesian conception it i> precisely thi; "Cartesianistic" motif 
that mu~l never be given lip. It i\ connected to the idea that there b 
an apodictic foundation, an "Archimedean point" that provide, a 
final foundation in the evidence of the ego '.I' {'ogiI055. The conse-
quence of the reduction pursued thu, far leads to a limited 
validation of the "Canesian" Husser!. It i, from this approach only 
that he can interpret the role of the philosopher in the whole of 
cultural activity of mankind. In order to secure this "cuhural-
philosophical" implication and in order to enable the philosopher 
to be more than a citi/en of an ivory tower, Husser! "needs" 
Cartcsianism. 
Yet. on the other side of the balances. there is the issue of the 
life-world. which becomes increasingly imponant to Husser!' 
Critics have interpreted Husser!'s turning to the pre-scientific 
world as a "departure from Carte5,iani~m"~6. One can summari/e 
the arguments for this interpretation essentially in that Husser! 
reali7ed that he could not lay an apodictic foundation in the Ego. 
Therefore. he (morc or Ie" consciously) abandoned this project 
and instead turned to the life-world as the actual working lield of 
phenomenology. Performing an "ontology of the life-world" i, the 
true task for phenomenology. In order to do thi,. one does not need 
a Cartesian reduction to a transcendental consciou,ness. Thu,. the 
54 . Kr;sis. p. 1 R8: after Crf,\/.fi, p. 184. 
55. Merten .. has dc"ott.:u the 'ccolld half of hi ... ,.hove mentioned .. tudy to 
.. howing Ihal Hu\~\!rl in hi ... 101'1 year- ha~ e ... ..,cllllUlly given up thi'i Ideal of Jil 
ultllnalc founding and m..:rgc ... bUlh ... keplic ant..! found:.uional mOllr ... in Ill.., concept 
of venfication (Bell'ii"rwlI:). Howe"er. il seem ... to mc problemallc to apply Ihi .. 
concept. which ha ... Il' 'y,tCI1131IC locu ... In [he phenomenon of horiLOm. (amllhcir 
prc\ulllllvity). to that of foum.lntlonali\m. 
56. err. LA'IOORLBI. "Departure from Carte ... iurw,m", in L . LA!\lX.iRI81. Till' 
Ph",wmel/(J/ogy of Edmund l-IInlt'rl. cd wilh <111 irurouuclion b) D. Welton. 
Ithaca I London, 1981. pp. 66· 121 . 
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departure has already occurred. as it were behind Husserl', back. 
the moment he turned to the life-world as his primary field of 
interest. This reading of Hlisserl's late philosophy has been very 
dominant in the first decade~ after Husserl'~ death and has clearly 
been influenced by Heideggers hermeneutic, of facticity. 
Moreover. it has been insinuated that Hcidegger influenced Hu"erl 
in his sketch of a life-world ontology. The fact that this ontology 
was never worked out in detail and only hinted at in the Crisis was 
taken as an implicit proof that the problem of the life-world was 
almost an afterthought. It was an idea hinted at rather than clearly 
seen in view of its consequences. namely, that it would lead 10 an 
abandoning of his transcendental project. 
However. in the P:l,t three decades a good deal of manuscript 
material from Husserl's Nacll/ass has been published showing that 
a "theory of world apperception"57, is in fact not only worked out 
in great detail; it has also become c lear that Husserl had been 
working on a life-world interpretation already going back to the 
second decade of the 20'h century. Since this material has become 
available, the "departure"-thesis has become highly problematic 
and there is eonscnsus among scholars that Husserl ultimately was 
not able to "achieve" this last step. More importantly it could never 
have been his intention to leave Cartesianism behind. 
As has been shown, transcendental and ontological analysis 
compliment each other. Therefore, the reduction is needed in order 
to access this life-world, since in all "normal" pursuit of life it is 
un-thematic. It remains all the more un-thcmatized in modern 
science, which by abstracting from the life-world is nevertheless 
bound to it unknowingly. Thematizing the life-world. as that which 
is always un-thematized in the natural attitude. means already 
having left the natural attitude. Nevertheless, this docs not mean 
doillg Ulm)' with it. To the contrary, it remains the basic form of 
life (the philosopher remains a citi/en. a father, a mother etc.). 
57. Thi~ i~ the title of 'cellon A VII of the Nadl/ll.H 10 the.: Husserl-Archl"e~ 
in LeU\ien. II contain~ 31 convolute., of manu\cript, mainly from the 20ic\ and 
30icl; . 
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From the tran scendent al standpoi nt one ullClc'"tands the natural 
allitude as a "lower" altitude. or which says the same, the natural 
altitude is already transcendental. yet without knowing il. 
For an onto logy of the life-world. this entails: If Husserl speaks 
of " restituting"58 the natural altitude in order to ga in a standpoint to 
analyze the life-world. this cannot mean that we, the analyzing 
phil o!>ophers. arc to "forget" the standpoint ga ined in the reduction. 
Going back into the o ld altitude. resusciwting the old naivete, 
is impOSSible. Rather, this step is to be understood as a quasi -
imaginary move: I pretend to go back into the "old" altitude and 
from the description of life-world can proceed in describing how 
life in the natural attitude was like before I even became aware of 
il. We can understand "restituti on" in this context as "recon-
struction" of something that has been "un-built" in transcendental 
analysis. This is why performing the reduction in no way stands in 
contradiction with the task of a life-world ontology. 
Yet. although this discipline is o nl y "enabled" by the trans-
ccndcntul turn , thi s ontology soon takes on its own character. 
Describing the world from its most primitive clements over first 
formations of communa l life to hi gher-order personalities and 
ending up finally in cultures, home-worlds. alien-worlds is a 
gigantic lield o f research. The rich methodical instruments Husserl 
has deve loped in hi s development of the genetic method give him 
the tool s needed to pursue this task . In fact, thi s method takes on 
the character of a hermencuti cs of thc life-world . It is a description 
of how the world we live in has come to be and how it fun cti ons. 
The term "hermeneutics" -which Husserl would not have used in 
,his context- is designated to mean precisely thi s. It is rather a 
descriptive than a normative discipline. In hi s analyses of Greek 
c ulture and philosophy. the "geneti c" is oftentimes undi stin-
gui shable from faclllal-historical analyses59 It is thu s nOt sur-
58 err. Krilis. p. 176. 
59. Which hn!> cau~cd lI u~seri to be charged with ·'Eurocentri ... m". Thll, 
di~Cll,\ioli cannOI be rellCnt lCd here, but what c.m "",me" Hu~'\erl from thcse 
charg!.:" to a cenain cx;tCnI i~ hi ... methodic approach in which he ex;plici tl y docs 
nOi W:1I11 to gi'Vc a factual ·bi,u)rical account but rather onc of "laws of genes;is;'·. In 
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pri sing Ihat sociology, po litical theory, hi slOry, and pedagogy have 
taken up Hu"eri' s ideas o n the life-world. Funhermore. it cannot 
be acci dc lIla l tha t the le rm "Lehe l/ .nrel," has beco me a ve ry 
commo n noti on that nowadays has lilli e to do with its orig in . The 
very "mundaneity" o f Ihe problem o f Ihe world o f life ex plains its 
remOleness fro m Lransccndenta l questions. 
ThU',. the inte rpretaLi on presellled here allempt s 10 o, ercome the 
common assertion that there b a "colllradiction" between Hu~serl'~ 
Ca rtesian positi on and his "ccount o f the life-world. I have tried to 
show th at a philosophi ca l the lll ati Lati o n o f the life-world is not 
possible without the fo rmer. At Ihe same time, I have insisted that 
Husse rl \ Carl esian account of the subject and hi s life-world 
ontology present /\\'o distil/ ct and in a ,ense separate programs. 
They arc projects Hus>erl pursues with different aims. Whereas Ihe 
"Can esian Hu"erl " pu" ucs a pmh of sciemific grounding and 
foundatio n" li"". the " life-world Hu sserI" is intereMcd in what can 
been ca lled a he rmeneuti cs o f the world o f everyd"y life . Both 
projects "re set squarel y ag,tinst each other I/ ot in the se nse thai 
they comradic i or even "annul " each other, but in that they pursue 
two diffe renl agendas. In fac t, one can pursue o ne while com-
plete ly neglecting Lhe othe r. One cal/ pUN,e a " theory" of the life-
world without a l all be ing interested in constituti o nal problems. 
Likewise. one can imlllcr)o.c onese lf in lranscendcnwi matters in the 
traditi o n o f transcendental philosoph y since Kant and German 
Ideali sm, and fruitfull y ul ili lc Hu sser!' , contribut ions LO tran s-
cendemal theorics60 Due to the fundamenta l c ritic is,,,, o f reason 
and ratio na lity in this ccnlUry in the wake o f critics o f enli ghten-
hi\ lat~ te;.;t on 'Teleology III the H I'iOr) 0 1 Phdo\ophy"' he cven Gil '" (hi ... 
rccon,lruct l'C rending an "111I~rprc l ation" : "Bul morc importanll ) \'c have 10 
counler the obJecllon Ihat Ihe IlO'I liol1 pul fonh here doc~ 1101 confi rm lfe.\h/t'lfmi 
purely hl l,lorical lac l ~. but Ihat II I ... an inlcrprcwliol}. i.e .. :l ... M I of ... ub"lruclion of 
fact... for which ull lc,timol1 ic .. i:lrC Int.'king" Ohm XX IX. p. 396. my tr<ln .. lalion). 
60. Onc example of thi.. i.. 10 he found 11\ K . Dcsl''';G. 
SelbJlbpu'ujJtH'III_,modelJe. Mot/erne Kririk('11 IIIIlI ,n'stemM/ficllf! £lItll'flr[e ;.ur 
kOIlJ..reten Subjd tl\ ihil. Munich. 1997. where he ta l.. e .. up Il u ..... crl a ... one 
'y!'!tcmalic vOice In :1 theory of a tr'.lI1 ... ccndcntal theory of ... eil-coll'lciou .. nc!t". Cfr. 
c'p. I 13- 16. 
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menL, it is understandable why this path has been of less illlere,1. 
This, however, can not be a reason to di"egard this aspect of 
Hus,erl. In fac!' neglecting the Cartesian Husserl leads to 
misunderstandings. These disregard the fact that Husserl never 
even cmne close to considering transcendental phenomenology and 
the idea(l) of rigorow, science a dream, let alone a dream that could 
come 10 an end. 
This leads. however. to the critique I would like to formulaic in 
conc lusion. Husserl Jailed to combine these two major aspects of 
his philosophical endeavor. There is neither just the Cartesian or 
the life-world Husserl. There is of systematic nece"ity both. 
However. there cannot be a syslemar;c pr;nciple uniting both. since 
formulating such a principle would make the problematic step of 
considering one of the two projects as absolute. The result of 
valorizing one is a dcvalu:Hion of the other. Thi, consequence is 
due 10 the Janus head of the phenomenological reduction. 
The reduction thus has the dallhle meaning of calling humanity 
to it, utmost possibilities of reason. 10 the "true" and "genuine' 
human being in one', self. on the one hand. On the other. it is to 
open up a full and all-embracing understanding of the world we 
live in. including oUr>elves as dwellers in this world of interests 
and distinct activities. However, there remains the conflict of 
absoilite humanity and relatil'e life pursuit, or, to say it in 
Ht",erl's famous formulation. we are len with the paradox oj 
1IIIIIlall subjectivifY. the resolving of which nobody else can decide 
but history ill>elf in which reason unfolds tclcologically-or where 
there is always the threat that it di~per"es and even become, losl. 
However, performing the phenomenologica l reduction to Husser! is 
nothing but thc constant aHempt to "come 10 reason," although 
there might be faclUal hindrances on the way 10 this ideal. One can 
say that with the reduction Husserl has touched upon the fun-
damental il>Sue of freedom. the freedom to be oneself, or which is 
to ~ay the same, the freedom to open oneself 10 rea~on as the true 
meaning of humanness. The possibility of performing the pheno-
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menological reduclion would Ihus be idelllical with the extent to 
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61. Cfr. H.- I.. VAN BRI:;DA: "St!inc Freiheit wicder/ugewinnen heiBt also. 
sich von der Well frei mach en odcr wcnig~ten \ ihre autonol11C Quelle. da'!' 
transzendcntalc Ego. wiedcrfindcn . Dicse Entdeckung is! bekanntlich !laeh 
Husser! nur durch die lranszendcntale Rcdultion moglich" ("Husser! und das 
Problem der Frcihci(', in: H. NOAC K, cd .. HU.'iserl. DannM3ch. 1973. pp. 277-281. 
here 281). 
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